SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE: THE AMBIVALENCE OF DEVELOPMENT MODELS (6-9)

6 Национальная ассоциация ученых (НАУ) # 58, 20 20
откладывается на неопределенный срок, либо не
реализуется вообще.
Отметим, что медицинские т ехнологии дали
постин дустриальному субъекту возможность
значительно продлить срок своей молодости (как
во внешнем облике, так и в психологическом
самоощущении). Одним из достижений
постиндустриального общества является то, что
молодость теперь не зависит о т биологического
возр аста: «Сама для себя из молодости я еще не
вышла и, полагаю, не выйду еще некоторое время.
Слишком уж привлекателен растиражированный и
уже устоявшийся образ молодежности […].
Безусловно, тезис о разрушении «ассоциации
между молодежнос тью и возрастом» ныне вполне
справедлив»[8, c. 457 -458]. Ощущая себя молодой
и свободной, современная женщина при желании
может осуществить любую репродуктивную
стратегию, в том числе и монородительскую
(стратегию «матери -одиночки»), особенно при
наличии д остаточного уровня ма териальной
обеспеченности.
Тот факт, что на место ценности производства
в постиндустриальном обществе приходит
ценность потребления, не подлежит сомнению. Это
столь же верно, как и то, что на смену советскому
аскетизму приходит постсов етский гедонизм.
Отме ченный ценностный сдвиг приводит в итоге к
тому, что индивид сам становится ребенком,
пользующимся плодами чужого труда и не
нуждающимся ни в собственных детях, ни в
интимной близости как таковой. Помимо движения
«child free » в ряде ст ран (в том числе Росс ии)
постепенно развивается движение, представители
которого осуществляют полный отказ от
сексуальной жизни.
В заключении следует сделать вывод о том,
что нормативно -ценностные установки человека
постиндустриального общества постепенно
приводят к тому, что институт традиционной семьи
отмирает. На смену ему приходят репродуктивные
стратегии, в качестве идеала предполагающие
партнерскую семью, свободные отношения
(сожительство) или монородительскую семью. При
этом, обладая значительной сво бодой,
постиндустриал ьный индивид готов полностью
отказаться от сексуальной активности и рождения
детей в пользу «жизни для себя».

Литература:
1. См. Вирилио П. Информационная бомба.
Стратегия обмана / П. Вирилио/ - М.: ИТДГК
«Гнозис», Фонд «Прагматика ку льтуры», 2002. –
192 с .
2. Жидкова Е. Практики разрешения семейных
конфликтов в 1950 -60 -е годы: обращения граждан
в общественные организации и партийные ячейки/
Е. Жидкова // Советская социальная политика:
сцены и действующие лица, 1940 -1985. – М.: ООО
«Ва риант», ЦСПГИ, 2008. С . 283.
3. Забаев И. «Своя жизнь», образование,
деторождение: мотивация репродуктивного
поведения в современной России/ И. Забаев//
Вестник общественного мнения. № 3 (105). 2010. С.
87 -97. С. 96.
4. Омельченко Е.Л. Начало молодежной эр ы
или смерть молодежно й культуры? «Молодость» в
публичном пространстве современности/
Е.Л. Омельченко // Журнал исследований
социальной политики. Т. 4. № 2. 2006. С. 152.
5. Гундаров И.Духовное неблагополучие и
демографическая катастрофа/ И. Гундаров. –
Эл ектронный ресурс. Режи м доступа:
http ://gorizontsobytij .ucoz .ru/publ /dukhovnoe _neblag
opoluchie _i_demograficheskaja _katastrofa /2-1-0-127
6. Яницкий М.С. Система ценностных
ориентаций «поколения Z»: социальные,
культурные и демографические детерминанты/
М.С. Яницкий, А.В. Серый, О.А. Браун,
Ю.В. Пелех, О.В. Маслова, М.В. Сокольская,
Р.Д. Санджаева, А.Р. Монсон ова, С.Б. Дагбаева,
Ю.Ю. Неяскина, Р.В. Кадыров, Т.В. Капустина //
Сибирский психологический журнал. 2019. № 72.
С. 46 -67. С.61.
7. Маркс К. Немецкая ид еология/ К. Маркс,
Ф. Энгельс – М.: Партиздат, 1934. С. 19.
8. Бредникова О. Там же. Бредникова О.
«Старородящая» молодая мать
(институциональные игры с категориями
возраста)// Новый быт современной России:
гендерные исследования повседневности:
коллективн ая монография. – СПб.: Издательство
Европейского университета в Санкт -Петербурге,
2009. С . 456 -472. С. 457 -458.

SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE: THE AMBIVALENCE OF DEVELOPMENT MODELS

Mamedov Agamali Kulamovich
doctor of Soc iological Sciences, professor
Moscow State Un iversity named after M.V. Lomonosov
Moscow, Russia
DOI: 10.31618/nas.2413 -5291.2020.1.58.275
Annotation
The article declares the position of dissensus and consensus as basic models for the development of social
sciences. The demarcation of natural sciences and social sciences is carried out. Atte mpts are being made to
identify the features of "acceptance" b y the scientific community. The article analyzes L. Laudan's concept of
consensus in modern social knowledge.
Keywords : dissensus, consensus, convention, epistemology, agreement, foundation, sci entific
communication.

Национальная ассоциация ученых (НАУ) # 58, 20 20 7
The global crisis, into which the world is rapidly
"rolling", once again raises the question of the
effectiveness of social cognition, the soundness of
conclusions and the reality of forecasts. The
fragmentation of the social scienc es, their unfounded
claim to methodological universality and to tality,
inevitably actualizes the question of the nature of social
cognition, the criteria of scientific character, optics and
the generally accepted scale of measurement. Unlike
natural scienc e, where the convention for the choice of
units of measurement is in most cases trivial and is
often carried out by default, in social cognition, the
adoption of such conventions becomes a problem for
the scientific community to accept new knowledge,
accul turation of knowledge, the foundation of its
conclusions, as we ll as translation of qualitative
properties and characteristics into quantitative
parameters. With all the awareness of that huge step in
the development of the social sciences, accomplished
by the positivists, in particular, O. Comte and G.
Spencer, we no te that they themselves, criticizing, often
unfairly and superficially, the preceding social science,
did not depart far from them in terms of claims on a
universal methodology. An attempt to i ncorporate
social knowledge into natural science, replacing
met aphysical (in the literal sense) concepts with
positivism, and very naive, led not only to the denial of
the great heritage of the classics, but also to ignoring
the subject of knowledge, his a ttitudes and values.
Subsequently, this problem had to be solve d in neo -
Kantianism, first of all, by Wilhelm Windelbandt. So,
in specific sociological studies, qualitative
characteristics (for example, prestige, social belonging,
opinion and needs) do not have uniform measurement
standards accepted by the entire commu nity, because
the content of these concepts is very wide and
heterogeneous. And the inherent characteristics are
very personal in nature. They (the specified parameters)
are constructed in acco rdance with the nature of the
object under study and according to the hypothesis of
the research, and, consequently, the personal attitude of
the scientist. The practical possibilities of
measurements essentially depend on the ability of the
researcher to find and substantiate (not only for
himself) a reliable measure ment procedure, to achieve
its acceptance in the nearest expert community [7]. So,
in particular, the most important procedure for
constructing a measurement scale and its founding
includes inv oluntarily conventional points that require
a qualitative class ification of objects (within the
framework of the research concept), highlighted in the
qualitative analysis of properties, identifying empirical
indicators of object properties that can be ran ked, etc.
Even this method specific sociological research as
content analysis also needs to translate qualitative
information "into the language of counting", because it
must be accepted and verified. The conventional
aspects here also increase significant ly in connection
with such an important factor as the ideologic al
principles and attitudes that underlie the selection and
isolation of the objects of analysis. At the same time,
both the "costs" of unreasonable and hasty agreements
and the corresponding m ethods of their prevention and
withdrawal are especially eviden t here. In particular,
methods of checking the measurement procedure for
reliability have been developed and are being
improved, which is determined by three criteria:
validity, stability and a ccuracy of the scale; for the
measurement procedure, the princi ples of utility and
pragmatics are formulated (the measurement system
must certainly correspond to the object of
measurement, the standard and units of measurement
must accurately record the pr operties and
characteristics of the object determined by the re search
program itself). These methods are implemented in a
specific study based on empirical material, only in this
way is the approbation of the accepted conventions
possible and widely used h ere. In general, it should be
noted that the uncertainty and am biguity of the
introduced conventions is largely due to the lack of a
developed and acculturated conceptual apparatus for
the transition from theoretical constructs to empirical
material [8].
The specificity of social and humanitarian
cognition, which is d ifficult to quantify, the
introduction of rigorous mathematical methods, as well
as experimental verification, are especially manifested
in attempts at the now fashionable computer modeling.
Interesting in this regard are the developments of
scientists in the field of engineering linguistics and
machine translation, whose accumulated rich material
is very important for understanding the nature of
humanitarian knowledge, the features of its metho ds,
including conventions, in particular in linguistic
sciences . The experience of linguistic research revealed
that one of the main (if not the most important)
difficulties in the work of scientists was the absence or
too narrow field of a well -grounded a nd accepted
methodological apparatus in the scientific communit y
that made it possible to correctly apply fundamental
theories or even paradigms to a specific linguistic
material in applied research. The impossibility of
checking the correspondence of the theory to the real
state of affairs led to the fact that lingui sts were forced
to rely on several, often mutually exclusive hypotheses,
violating the logic and methodology of the study. It is
obvious that in this case the problem of convention
arises, firs t of all, as a problem of choosing a hypothesis
(theory) and th e concept underlying it; the criterion for
such a choice is, at best, formal truth. Thus, it is obvious
that scientific search, in the social sciences, is
impossible without the conventional ch oice of a
hypothesis (operationally interpreted concepts, units
and methods of measurement, that is, the entire optics
of research) as a "working", since there is no conceptual
and operational apparatus of application theories to
empirical concrete materia l and it is impossible to
directly (experimentally) test the co nformity of the
hypothesis to the state of affairs [6].
A similar situation takes place in sociological
research, where the a priori accepted "one -thread" (B.
Khazanov's term) theoretical propo sitions often
generate very unusual conclusions. The marginal
intelligible constructs generated in the minds suddenly
gave rise to global and all -encompassing conclusions.
Hence, a methodological requirement arises, which is

8 Национальная ассоциация ученых (НАУ) # 58, 20 20
more and more realized by human ities researchers: a
constant critical analysis of the foundati ons of
hypotheses, the testing of explicit or implicit
conventions included in them, a conscious overcoming
of the tendency to elevate the content of such
agreements to the rank of objective la ws is necessary.
Consensus in cognitive activity, reflecting it s
communicative nature, can receive the status of
scientific concepts, hypotheses, methods, in essence,
only with their collective acceptance. As the British
researcher S. Toulmin noted, an ind ividual initiative
can lead to the discovery of new truths, the
development of new concepts is a purely collective
matter. The new proposal will be worthy of
experimentation and early development once it is
collectively considered worthy of attention. The
statement of these facts necessarily actualizes the
problem of the adoption and functioning of conventions
in conditions of professional consent (consensus) or
disagreement (dissensus). Consensus is understood as
the degree of consolidation, consistency in the
scientific community regarding cognitive standards,
ontolo gical prerequisites, and the system of value
orientations in general. Consent (disagreement,
mismatch) is investigated as a kind of communication
mechanism in a variety of functions, one of whi ch is to
be the logical basis for the development of scientific
knowledge, which is also important for understanding
the nature of social science. In particular, the
methodological consensus is the adoption of
conventions on cognitive standards for the cho ice of the
central, priority problem, the premises of its resea rch,
acceptable theoretical approaches, methods and
techniques, and useful techniques. By itself, a high
degree of consensus does not guarantee the
effectiveness of research if the unanimously adopted
conventions are of a trivial nature and stand aside fro m
the fundamental substantive problems. Consequently,
the influence of consensus on the development of
knowledge significantly depends on the nature of the
methodology itself, conventionally ch osen by the
researchers.
In the humanities, many meanings and
interpretations of the results of empirical research are
usually offered, scientists tend to offer their own
interpretation of observations each time. This suggests
that one should always bear i n mind the possible
discrepancy between the adopted conventions and the
consensus - in general, a fairly widespread occurrence
of such a situation, which is not at all irrational or
unproductive. Often in modern epistemology of science
(K. Popper, P. Fayer abend, T. Kuhn, etc.), either the
problem of explaining the hig h degree of agreement
that is achieved in the science of the 20th century (40 -
50s), or the phenomenon of disagreements and
bifurcations in science and their rational resolution (60 -
70s). Most l ikely, the high degree of agreement in the
40 -50s is explained by the general global task of
explaining the phenomenon of totalitarianism. The
general object of research has generated a certain time
period of the "model" consensus. Further social
developme nt gave rise to other models. But at the same
time, it is obvio us that there is a need for some unified
theory explaining the emergence and mutual transition
of consensus and dissensus in science. The solution to
this dilemma is offered by the famous Ameri can
sociologist Larry Laudan in his work Science and
Values, wh o claims that in the humanities and social
sciences, the differences are of the nature of an
"epidemic", while in natural science, most scientists
agree, at least on the fundamental components
knowledge (even earlier T. Kuhn expressed a similar
idea). Trad itionally, it was believed that disagreement
only arises if the evidence of fact is relatively weak and
incomplete and it is enough to involve additional
evidence or appropriate rules - and agr eement will be
reached. Laudan postulates that the problem shou ld be
considered at the "intersection between the works of
philosophers and sociologists", since agreement, in
particular when choosing a theory, develops not only in
relation to the fact, but also in (first of all) the relation
of methodological and axiol ogical justification, which
was written about neo -Kantians. In addition, it is
necessary to take into account that the classical
tendency to regard consensus as a condition of
rationality, and dissensus as a condition of irrationality,
is undermined by a n umber of factors actually acting in
science. According to Laudan, there are four of them in
general: scientific research is constantly in a situation
of discussion, which is their inherent prop erty; the
relationship between theories can be defined by the
"incommensurability thesis"; there are situations of
"underdetermination" of theories by empirical data;
finally, successful research activity in a "state of
dissensus" is possible, and scientis ts who had high
achievements most often violated the establishe d
norms. It follows from this that the consensus model,
as a rule, is incomplete and does not correspond to the
dynamics of real science; rather, dissensus is its
attribute and marker. The domi nant model of any
scientific justification is hierarchical: at the lower level,
the “factual” (factual consensus) is discussed, then
generally accepted methodological rules as a means of
achieving the goals of science (methodological
consensus), and finall y, the consensus of values and
goals. The latter is either no t recognized or not taken
into account, since it has always been assumed that the
values and goals of research are the same and equally
understood by all. This model "postulates a
unidirectio nal ladder of reasoning" from goals to
factual statements, wher eas in real science, reasoning
goes in any conceivable field, linking goals, methods
and results. Laudan is convincing in the assertion that
there are no privileged levels, axiology, methodolog y
and factual statements inevitably interact and
intertwine. Co nsideration in the integrity of all three
levels expresses the essence of the "network model" of
scientific rationality, which makes it possible to
understand the variety of their combinations that
underlie consensus or dissensus. The network model
expands the understanding of scientific rationality, not
only linking it with a consensus on the goal, facts or
methods, and even more so because there is a constant
"shift in cognitive values", theor ies and methods
change, accordingly, new conventions are applie d, old
ones are excluded, consensus and dissensus always

Национальная ассоциация ученых (НАУ) # 58, 20 20 9
exist, complementing each other and reflecting the
general communicative nature of science. These ideas
can become the basis for further study of the problem
of conventionality as a consequence of co mmunicative
relations in scientific knowledge [2].

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